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Executive Summary 
 
The Right to Food Campaign in India began in 
2001. It was a time of absurd paradox. Even as the 
foodgrain stocks held by the government rose to 
50 million metric tons, several parts of the country 
were reeling from a third consecutive year of 
drought. The threat of severe hunger loomed large, 
yet efforts to address this threat were insufficient. 
In April 2001 the People’s Union for Civil Liberties, 
Rajasthan, an active civil society group in the north 
Indian state of Rajasthan, submitted a writ petition 
to the Supreme Court of India. Briefly, the petition 
demanded that the country’s food stocks be used 
without delay to protect people from hunger and 
starvation. This petition led to a prolonged “public 
interest litigation”1 (PUCL vs. Union of India and 
Others, Writ Petition [Civil] 196 of 2001). Supreme 
Court hearings have been held since then at regular 
intervals, and significant “interim orders” have been 
issued by the court from time to time regarding 
the scope and implementation of eight food-related 
schemes of the Government of India. The litigation 
provided a springboard for the Right to Food 
Campaign. 
 
The Right to Food Campaign (RFC) asserts that 
“everyone has a fundamental right to be free from 
hunger and malnutrition and that the primary 
responsibility for guaranteeing these entitlements 
rests with the state” (Right to Food Campaign 
2005). Further, if people’s basic needs are not a 
political priority, then state intervention itself 
depends on effective popular organization using 
democratic means. In broad terms, the RFC’s role is 
to ensure that hunger and malnutrition become a 
political priority and that resources reach the 
intended beneficiaries. The Right to Food Campaign 
is, however, not merely a pressure group that 
secures increased allocations to food schemes. It is 
a social movement with a much broader agenda, 
playing an important role in bringing down the 
barriers that people face in gaining access to the 
programs and resources to which they are entitled. 
                                                 
1 Public interest litigation (PIL) is a process by which 
certain issues can be taken up by any concerned citizen 
in the public interest. These issues are typically taken up 
in the High Courts or the Supreme Court of India. PILs 
have significantly shaped social policy in India on issues 
including environment, education, hunger, governance, 
and domestic violence. 
In the Indian context, barriers of various kinds, 
including corruption, apathy, and many forms of 
social discrimination, make it difficult, and at times 
even impossible, for the intended beneficiaries to 
gain access to the programs expressly meant for 
them. Those at risk of hunger are necessarily poor, 
but also tend to be socially powerless and mar-
ginalized. The RFC recognizes that the realization of 
the right to be free from hunger and malnutrition 
depends critically on entitlements to livelihood 
security, such as the right to work, land reform, 
and social security.  
 
From the perspective of people within state institu-
tions, social movements such as the Right to Food 
Campaign pose a confounding dilemma. On the 
one hand, the Right to Food Campaign is an ally in 
the government’s fight against hunger and malnu-
trition. The RFC achieves its goals through collec-
tive action—by taking on the state and its func-
tionaries, often exposing the weak links, leakage, 
and corruption. How do policy makers engage with 
such a social movement?  
 
Your assignment is to recommend how the 
Government of India can engage with the Right to 
Food Campaign as an ally in its fight against hunger 
and malnutrition. What can it do at the macro-
policy level to address these issues? And what 
measures can it take to break the network of 
vested interests that undermine the implementation 
of food-related programs? 
 
Background  
 
The Context of Food Policy in India  
A three-year-old girl named Kuttima could benefit 
from attending the local child care center, but her 
mother will not send her, because Kuttima is a Dalit 
child, and the upper-caste worker in the center may 
not clean her if the child defecates. Periama, her 
neighbor, is a widow who has applied for the 
pension for destitute widows and does not know if 
she has been selected for the scheme. The village 
head says that she is not on the beneficiary list, but 
rumor in the village has it that she is on the list 
and that the village head is siphoning away the 
money. She has no way of finding out. Other 
people in the village where Kuttima and Periama live 
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have similar problems. The village experienced a 
massive drought last year. Because the villagers are 
dependent on agriculture, none of them had any 
work during the drought. The relatively rich had 
some savings to fall back on, but the poor faced a 
life or death struggle. The government initiated 
some labor-intensive employment projects in the 
village. A man named Maman got 15 days of work, 
but the supervisor paid him for only 10 days of 
work. That was unjust, but Maman was too scared 
to protest—what if he were denied even that?  
 
Stories like these are common across India. Food 
programs in India are meager in scale, and even 
these do not often reach the people entitled to 
them. Barriers of various kinds, including cor-
ruption, apathy, and many forms of social discrimi-
nation, make it difficult, even impossible, for the 
intended beneficiaries to access programs expressly 
meant for them. Those at risk of hunger are neces-
sarily poor, but in addition tend to be socially 
powerless and marginalized. This is the context in 
which food policy is framed in India; this is also the 
context that motivates the efforts of the Right to 
Food Campaign in India.  
 
The Right to Food Campaign asserts that “every-
one has a fundamental right to be free from 
hunger and malnutrition and that the primary 
responsibility for guaranteeing these entitlements 
rests with the state” (Right to Food Campaign 
2005). Furthermore, if people’s basic needs are not 
a political priority, then state intervention itself 
depends on effective popular organization using 
democratic means. In broad terms, the RFC’s role is 
to ensure that hunger and malnutrition are high 
political priorities and that resources reach the 
intended beneficiaries. The Right to Food Campaign 
is not, however, merely a pressure group that 
secures increased budgetary allocations to food 
schemes. It is a social movement with a much 
broader agenda, playing an important role in 
bringing down the barriers that people face in 
gaining access to what is meant for them. It also 
recognizes that the realization of the right to be 
free from hunger and malnutrition depends 
critically on entitlements to livelihood security, 
such as the right to work, land reform, and social 
security. Given its broad scope, it is difficult to 
address the RFC in its entirety in a single case 
study. This case therefore offers a snapshot of two 
aspects of the Campaign: securing policy changes at 
the macro-level and working at the grassroots level 
to make policies work.   
 
The Right to Food Campaign: Historical 
Overview  
The story of the Right to Food Campaign begins in 
the north Indian state of Rajasthan in 1999–2000. 
The state had faced a series of droughts that 
eroded livelihoods and exposed large sections of 
the population to starvation. An estimated 33 
million people were affected (Right to Food Cam-
paign 2006). Under conditions of drought, gov-
ernments typically take up a variety of relief meas-
ures, the most important of which is provision of 
employment at minimum wages to allow individuals 
and families to sustain themselves. On this occa-
sion, civil society groups in Rajasthan were 
concerned that the scale of drought relief was too 
small. 
 
It was also a time of absurd paradox. Even as parts 
of the country were reeling from the severe stress 
of drought for the third consecutive year, food-
grain stocks held by the government exceeded 50 
million metric tons. This level was far above the 
norms set by the government for buffer stocks.2 In 
fact, government warehouses were overflowing, and 
with storage capacity filled, mounds of grain were 
left out in the open.  
 
In Rajasthan a veteran activist Om Srivastava floated 
the idea of calling a meeting on the issue, but this 
meeting did not happen until drought struck again 
the following year. In June 2000 an information-
sharing meeting was organized in which 300 
organizations from across the state participated. A 
spate of activities followed, including an ”action-
oriented meeting” in December 2000 in which the 
chief minister (CM) participated. The CM was sym-
pathetic but argued that state finances were 
strained and that the involvement of the Govern-
ment of India was crucial. As the drought wor-
sened, activists decided to intensify the struggle 
and organized a large meeting close to the Legisla-
tive Assembly building attended by, among others, 
many well-known intellectuals and journalists. Given 
that officials from the center and the state were 
constantly passing the buck to each other, the 
                                                 
2 In July 2001, for instance, whereas the established norm 
for buffer stocks was a minimum of 24.3 million metric 
tons (for rice and wheat), the stocks were in fact 61.7 
million tons (Government of India 2002). 
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organizers brought officials from both levels of 
government onto the same platform at this 
meeting. This meeting became one of the spring-
boards for RFC nationally.3 
 
Critical to this mobilization of support for the RFC 
was Rajasthan’s long tradition of partnership among 
civil society actors in fighting for a common cause. 
One such network of organizations was already 
active in a campaign for the right to information. 
The network comprised many organizations with 
very different profiles, sources of funding, sizes, 
and ideologies. They were also well distributed 
geographically, covering most districts in Rajasthan. 
During periods of intense struggle, most organiza-
tions pooled their resources—manpower, finances, 
and skills. In the process, the People’s Union for 
Civil Liberties, Rajasthan (PUCL)4 had already 
emerged as an informal node of networking.  
 
As the food crisis loomed in parts of Rajasthan, in 
many other parts of Rajasthan and elsewhere in the 
country, rodents and birds were helping themselves 
to the grain stored out in the open. There was 
even a suggestion that some grain be dumped into 
the Arabian Sea! ”Hunger amidst plenty” became 
the refrain. The absurdity of the state’s policies 
became the focus of the campaign. To highlight the 
issue, demonstrations were held in front of state-
managed food depots in different parts of 
Rajasthan. The campaign drew media attention to 
“hunger deaths,” traditionally a strong political 
issue in India. Neelabh Mishra published an article 
in the newspaper Hindustan Times called “An 
Anatomy of Hunger,” a moving case study of a few 
hunger deaths in the state. Another prominent 
journalist, P. Sainath, wrote a series of articles in 
The Hindu, a leading national newspaper, giving 
hunger greater visibility and causing deep embar-
rassment to a government “sitting over food 
mountains.”   
 
During this time Colin Gonsalvez, a leading lawyer, 
urged the group to approach the Supreme Court 
of India. Given the reluctance of the courts to take 
up cases involving “policy issues,” the participants 
pursued this suggestion with little hope. In April 
2001 the PUCL, Rajasthan, submitted a writ 
                                                 
3 It is difficult to pinpoint the beginnings of a campaign. 
In the view of the authors, this is one of the many 
important events that led to the formation of the RFC. 
4 PUCL is a national network, and it was only the 
Rajasthan chapter that was closely involved in the RFC. 
petition to the Supreme Court of India. Briefly, the 
petition demanded that the country's food stocks 
be used without delay to protect people from 
hunger and starvation.5 As things turned out, the 
petition led to a prolonged “public interest litiga-
tion” (PUCL vs. Union of India and Others, Writ 
Petition [Civil] 196 of 2001). Supreme Court 
hearings have been held since then at regular inter-
vals. The campaign’s success in highlighting “food 
mountains” made it difficult for the government to 
argue that it did not have resources. Instead, the 
government responded by saying it was already 
implementing eight large food-related programs 
and that no new measure was required. The peti-
tioner pointed out that many of these schemes 
existed only on paper and were not being imple-
mented. On November, 28, 2001, the court 
directed the government to faithfully implement all 
the schemes it had pointed out on paper. Because 
India is a common law country, where a direction 
from the Supreme Court automatically becomes a 
law, this ruling effectively converted all eight 
schemes into legal entitlements. 
 
Apart from the legal implications, the court’s 
direction had important consequences for public 
debate. For example, the order of November 28, 
2001, made school feeding a legal entitlement of 
every child attending government-run and govern-
ment-funded primary schools. The order set the 
frame of reference for how extensive school feed-
ing should be and which children should be 
covered. The court set February 2002 as the dead-
line for partial implementation of this order and 
June 2002 for full implementation. When most 
states “defaulted,” they were framed as “violating 
the law” and “not caring for children.” The cam-
paign then decided to appeal to organizations 
across India to observe April 9, 2002, as a “day of 
action” for school feeding. This appeal received 
overwhelming support, with demonstrations in 
almost 1,000 villages across India.6 The network 
that was formed became the core of the Right to 
Food Campaign nationally.   
 
                                                 
5 For details, see Right to Food Campaign (2006).  
6 This is an informal estimate made by one of the 
authors at the end of the mobilization based on feedback 
from various regions. Given the decentralized nature of 
the campaign, information is not precise, but the author 
believes that this is a reasonably reliable estimate. 
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The Right to Food Campaign Today 
Like the network in Rajasthan, the Right to Food 
Campaign functions today as an informal network 
of organizations committed to realizing the right to 
food.  Given the growth of the RFC, a new secre-
tariat was set up with one person working full-
time.7 The bulk of the work is done by volunteers. 
The secretariat functions with minimal funding 
raised entirely from small individual donations.8  
The secretariat serves to enable communication and 
to organize periodic conferences where participants 
can meet face-to-face and determine the priorities 
of the RFC. 
 
The secretariat collects and shares a wide variety of 
information including Campaign activities and 
implementation of Supreme Court orders by the 
states. Information is shared through a website 
(www.righttofoodindia.org), a widely circulated 
newsletter, periodic meetings, and other measures. 
Since 2003 the secretariat has also organized two 
to three national meetings each year at which par-
ticipants decide on strategies. Further, activists 
working on the right to food need an assortment 
of skills, such as organizing small-scale local 
surveys, medically establishing hunger deaths, and 
organizing social audits. The secretariat builds these 
tools or solicits them from groups with expertise 
on the selected issue. It has also been involved in 
creating cultural materials including posters, 
pamphlets, plays, and poems. Finally, the secretariat 
has organized many national demonstrations. 
 
Policy Issues  
 
Few countries in the world have health and nutri-
tion indicators as disastrous as India’s. According 
the second National Family Health Survey (1998–
1999), 47 percent of all Indian children are under-
nourished, 52 percent of all adult women are 
anemic, and 36 percent have a body mass index 
(BMI) of less than 18.5 (implying chronic energy 
deficiency). In fact, according to the Human 
Development Report, only two countries 
(Bangladesh and Nepal) have a higher proportion of 
undernourished children than India, and only two 
countries (Bangladesh and Ethiopia) have a higher 
                                                 
7 One of the authors, S. Vivek, served in this capacity 
from 2002 to 2005. 
8 One exception to this practice was a donation from Z-
Trust, set up by eminent writer Arundhati Roy. 
proportion of infants with low birth weight (Drèze 
2004).  
 
Yet fighting hunger and malnutrition have not 
been a high policy priority in India. When India 
embarked on broad-based economic reforms in 
1991, expenditures on the social sector as a percent-
age of gross domestic product (GDP) declined and 
have not increased by much since the mid-1990s.9 
Furthermore, India has achieved only a quarter of 
its target under the Millennium Development 
Goals. Indeed, the verdict on India’s progress over 
the period 1990–2004 is expressed succinctly in a 
report from the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF): “making progress, but insufficient” 
(UNICEF 2006b).  
 
Even in the public sphere, discussions on health 
and malnutrition are conspicuous by their absence. 
For instance, The Hindu publishes two opinion 
articles every day on its editorial page. In a count 
of these opinion articles between January and June 
2000, it was found that health, nutrition, educa-
tion, poverty, gender, human rights, and related 
social issues combined accounted for barely 30 out 
of 300 articles; not one dealt with health or 
nutrition.10  
 
Apart from the amount of resources allocated, 
what is allotted is often underutilized, and a signi-
ficant proportion is routinely lost to inefficiency 
and corruption. What is left is often appropriated 
by relatively powerful social groups, leaving very 
little to the marginalized people who are in 
desperate need of these programs. The socially 
disadvantaged include lower castes, women, 
children, widows, the aged, and the illiterate, among 
others. They are often the worst victims of corrup-
tion as well, as illustrated by the accounts 
presented in the beginning of this case study.  
 
However well-crafted a food scheme might be, its 
efficacy is far from self-evident. Take the case of 
                                                 
9 See Mooij and Dev (2004) for a detailed discussion of 
social sector priorities as reflected in the annual budgets. 
10 Low coverage of social policy issues is common in 
many countries. For a detailed study on this issue, see 
Franklin (1999, 287). Curran (1991, 266) offers interesting 
insights on the media and policy in democracies. For a 
broader discussion on the role of the media, see Brophy-
Baermann and Bloeser (2006), Drèze and Sen (1989), 
Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Kuhn (1995, 284), and 
Stromberg (2004). 
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the public distribution system (PDS). India has the 
largest public distribution system in the world, and 
the PDS is also the largest food-related scheme of 
the Government of India. It channels up to 15 
percent of grain production in the country to 
poorer consumers. State agencies purchase food 
grain from farmers across the country and dis-
tribute it at a subsidized price through a large net-
work of Fair Price Shops (FPSs). These FPSs are 
contracted out to private dealers or run by coop-
eratives, village governments, or other means. A 
large part of the network is managed by private 
dealers. To ensure that the system functions well, 
the government has designed an elaborate system 
of accounting and monitoring.  
 
Every purchase is to be marked on the ration card 
that is held by the beneficiary, so that the bene-
ficiary knows what is being accounted for. The 
stock position is updated regularly on a board in 
front of the shop. There are strict accounting 
norms for the transactions that are maintained in 
the registers at the shop. Food inspectors regularly 
visit the shops to inspect the registers and to talk 
with people about their experiences. Furthermore, 
people can visit the inspectors to register com-
plaints to be investigated. Malfeasance by the 
vendor can result in criminal prosecution. The pos-
sibility of stiff punishments, along with monitoring 
by inspectors and beneficiaries, creates a tight 
incentive system for the vendors to operate 
properly. Most would agree that this is a well-
designed scheme. Indeed, it is a perfect system—on 
paper.  
 
In practice, things are quite different. In some 
states, it works rather well. But in several others, it 
is almost dysfunctional. Parivartan, an activist 
group, found that the residents of a slum in Delhi, 
where Parivartan worked, had a litany of complaints 
about the system. Food grains were seldom availa-
ble. The dealers routinely told them that they could 
do nothing about it, since stocks had not come. 
The stock boards were never kept, and even if they 
were, residents had no confidence that the informa-
tion on them was correct. The vendor had false 
measures and an assortment of tricks to give 
people much less than their entitlement. Kerosene, 
for instance, forms a large share of the budget of 
people in the slum, but it was not unusual for them 
to get just three liters instead of the five they were 
entitled to. These beneficiaries knew they were 
being cheated but were not able to do much since 
the vendor was a “powerful” man with connections. 
Many others were not even aware that they were 
being cheated since they did not know they were 
beneficiaries. 
 
As the example illustrates, the challenges of food 
policy design and implementation are manifold. It is 
not merely a matter of making rules. An effective 
food policy requires a close understanding of the 
social, political, and cultural context in which the 
policy is to be implemented. Furthermore, to 
understand hunger and malnutrition in India (and 
elsewhere), it is important to look at poverty as 
well as other kinds of deprivations. For example, 
social relations in India, including caste structure 
and gender relations, have an important impact in 
many ways. We are unable to take up this topic in 
detail in this paper, but we highlight these issues 
and illustrate their importance in policy making.11   
 
Stakeholders  
 
Identifying groups of people who could gain 
materially is important in understanding human 
actions because economic incentives are one of the 
most important motivations for human behavior. 
To borrow from a popular movie, “following the 
money” provides the most important clues to 
people who have stakes in the system. At the same 
time, it is equally important to consider other 
motivations, including a social commitment to 
ensure that everyone is free from hunger.12 Com-
mitted activists, honest officials, intellectuals, and 
many politicians have a different stake in how well 
the scheme functions.13 Without this recognition, it 
is impossible to understand the role of social 
                                                 
11 The following works deal with the interrelationship 
between social policy and social relations: Alesina et al. 
(1999), Banerjee and Somanathan (2001); Banerjee et al. 
(2005), Pande (2003), and Thorat and Lee (2005). For a 
general review of caste and politics in a democracy, see 
Ambedkar and Rodrigues (2004, 572). For related issues 
including gender, see Agarwal (1992), Anderson and 
Halcoussis (1996); Haddad (1996); Halcoussis and 
Lowenberg (1998), Kuiper and Barker (2005), McIlwaine 
and Datta (2003), and Nussbaum (1999, 2003). 
12 Amartya Sen has interesting discussions on this topic 
and its significance in economics and policy making. For 
examples, see Sen (2000, 366) and Sen (1977). 
13 In an interesting article Jos Mooij argues that the 
political stakes are determined by how active grassroots 
movements are (Mooij 1999a; see also Mooij 1999b, 
2005). 
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movements and their considerable influence in 
policy design and implementation. When it comes 
to an issue as basic as hunger, most people share a 
concern that society should be free from hunger. 
In this sense, all of us are important stakeholders in 
this framework. 
 
Clearly, the critical group of stakeholders here 
consists of those vulnerable to hunger. This group 
includes poor people and those who are margin-
alized and socially disadvantaged, including, but not 
confined to, backward castes. Recognizing this 
stakeholder group is the most challenging and 
important task in food policy.  The Right to Food 
Campaign has identified many groups who belong 
to this stakeholder group. They include, among 
others, landless laborers, poor women and Dalits, 
widows and aged people without support, families 
with disabled people, children under six, and 
school-going children. Some people have been 
critical of the RFC for leaving out vulnerable 
groups including the urban poor, children out of 
school, and many socially stigmatized groups. 
Identifying those in “need” has always been a highly 
political act that mirrors cultural norms. In the U.S. 
context, this debate is often articulated around 
“deserving” and ”undeserving poor,” the definitions 
of which have changed over time.14 One of the 
crucial tasks of social movements in food policy is 
to identify and articulate needs and bring the 
existence of hunger to the attention of policy 
makers. 
 
In contrast to groups that would benefit from the 
RFC, there is a resilient network of vested interests 
that benefit directly from leakage and corruption. 
These interests include corrupt officials, politicians, 
middlemen, and contractors of government 
projects, among others. Apart from affecting 
implementation, these powerful groups often have 
a large impact on policy making as well. Recogniz-
ing this, the Supreme Court of India has banned 
the use of private contractors in most food 
schemes in India.15 The vested interests have the 
                                                 
14 For some interesting discussions see Brodkin (1993) and 
Handler and Hasenfeld (1991). 
15 Private contractors typically tend to be wealthy and 
politically well connected (often a precondition for 
getting contracts). These characteristics enable them to 
violate laws with greater impunity than government offi-
cials. Furthermore, as things stand, accountability laws 
are much less confining for contractors than for 
government officials, setting perverse incentives. For a 
greatest interest in keeping the system inefficient 
and corrupt and would stand to lose if trans-
parency and accountability were restored. 
 
The power of these vested interests is evident in 
the example of the PDS in the Delhi slum. 
Parivartan decided to test the built-in incentive 
system in the scheme and started filing complaints 
with the inspectors, offering extensive testimony 
and evidence.16 Nothing transpired because the 
inspectors were in ”nexus” with the vendors and 
were beneficiaries of the corrupt scheme. 
Inspectors failed to register complaints and, if 
pressed to do so, would fail to follow up. If pressed 
further, they would initiate an investigation that 
would be a nonstarter. On one occasion Arvind 
Kejriwal, the head of Parivartan, was walking with 
an inspector in the colony when he pointed out 
that the FPS was not open when it should be. The 
inspector turned his head the other direction and 
said he did not have the time to investigate! 
 
For this group with vested interests, it was critical 
to ensure that the formal incentive system was not 
activated, for if prosecuted, a vendor could be 
jailed for a considerable duration. Vendors dealt 
with this danger through informal means and by 
carefully building several layers of protection. First, 
they had a strong nexus with the inspectors, but 
they had to make sure that the inspectors them-
selves were not penalized. So the vendors solicited 
the support of higher officials and politicians who 
had great influence on the officials. That left them 
to tackle the beneficiaries and those acting on their 
behalf. They tried the carrot and the stick with the 
beneficiaries who were agitating. The “troublesome” 
ones were promised their entitlements and told 
that they might never get them again if they failed 
to stop agitating. The vendors met the activists and 
promised them huge bribes. When that failed, they 
turned to more drastic measures. A young activist 
was clandestinely attacked with a sharp instrument, 
which “fortunately” slit her chin rather than her 
throat. Another activist was attacked the next 
week; the attackers were never found. Even if the 
attackers had later been found, it would have been 
impossible to establish that the vendors were 
behind this attack. The vendors were obviously 
                                                                         
good discussion on this issue, see Gilmour and Jensen 
(1998). 
16 Some of this effort is documented on Parivartan’s 
website (http://parivartan.com). 
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going to great lengths and were willing to take 
significant risks to escape punishment.  
 
While this story describes two particular groups 
with conflicting interests, many others have indirect 
stakes in food policy. For example, some people are 
vehemently opposed to government expenditure 
on food schemes. Others have strong opinions on 
what form food policy should take. For example, 
some international organizations such as the World 
Food Programme (WFP) have a strong preference 
for fortified snacks. The motivation for preferences 
could, in general, be ideological or material for the 
individual or organization (see Nestle 2002).  
 
This complex web of stakeholders has significant 
influence on food policy even if some stakeholders 
are not directly engaged in it. The effectiveness of 
food policy is thus influenced by several interests—
some coincident, others conflicting—working 
simultaneously.  
 
Policy Options  
 
This section looks at how the different actors navi-
gate this complex setting to shape policy and how 
concerned officials could respond.17 
 
The Right to Food Campaign in Perspective 
To put the work of the RFC in perspective, we take 
up two instances. At one level, the RFC fights for 
policy change above, engaging with policymakers 
and government. At another level, it works locally, 
effecting changes at the micro-level.  
 
Fighting for policy change above. At the macro-
level, the RFC was strengthened by its success in 
getting school-feeding programs implemented 
across the states in India. It then rallied for far-
reaching measures to secure entitlements. Five 
measures emerged as priorities: (1) universal school 
feeding, (2) universal child care for children under 
six, (3) an Employment Guarantee Act, (4) food 
                                                 
17 This case study is confined to the issue of how the 
state can engage with social movements in the making 
and implementation of food policy. There are other 
highly relevant issues, such as how civil society actors can 
engage with the state and with vested interest groups, 
both at the local and at the national level. These issues 
are no less important, but we do not take them up here. 
security for groups vulnerable to destitution, and 
(5) the strengthening of the public distribution 
system. The RFC sustained activities in each of 
these areas simultaneously. This section considers 
one of them—the Employment Guarantee Act 
(henceforth, EGA)—perhaps the RFC’s most 
important achievement to date. 
 
The idea of an employment guarantee cannot be 
understood without accounting for the discourse 
of fiscal austerity. India’s policy discourse has 
shifted sharply from socialism to market funda-
mentalism in the past three decades. This trend has 
been particularly acute since the early 1990s. Fiscal 
austerity has come to be regarded as indispensable 
for growth, and growth has come to be seen as the 
antidote to poverty. Under the circumstances, 
there would be stiff resistance to an EGA that 
requires large financial outlays. Nonetheless, the 
campaign started working toward an EGA, ener-
gized by the success of the campaign on school 
feeding.  
 
Employment was already high on the agenda, given 
the string of droughts in Rajasthan. During the 
2003 drought, Rajasthan was scheduled to have an 
election. The chief minister of Rajasthan at that 
time was sympathetic to the idea but argued that it 
was infeasible with the state’s finances. Nonetheless 
he agreed to push the idea with the national head-
quarters of his party. The Congress (I), a national 
party, had developed a system of holding periodic 
meetings of all its CMs in different states. Between 
2003 and 2005 the party endorsed the idea of an 
employment guarantee in many meetings of its 
CMs. Before the Rajasthan elections the party 
organized a meeting in the Parliament in which it 
invited prominent members of the RFC to discuss 
the EGA with its parliamentarians. The meeting was 
chaired by Manmohan Singh, who subsequently 
became prime minister. Congress (I) lost the elec-
tion in Rajasthan, but many key members had by 
this time absorbed the idea of an EGA. Soon after, 
a combination of fortuitous political circumstances 
served the RFC well.18 In the run-up to the national 
elections in June 2004, the RFC convinced the 
Congress (I) to include EGA as one of its poll 
promises. To everyone’s surprise, the Congress 
Party emerged with the largest number of seats, 
                                                 
18 On the importance of fortuitous circumstances for 
social movements and policy making, see Kingdon (1984, 
240). 
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and its allies also won a significant number of seats, 
giving them a comfortable majority. The Left 
Parties won their largest number of seats in India’s 
electoral history, and they decided to support the 
Congress Party from the outside. The allies decided 
to draft a “Common Minimum Programme” (CMP), 
which provided an agenda for governance.   
 
The RFC pointed out that the EGA was one of the 
poll promises, and it also appealed to the Left 
Parties to support the program. The RFC won a 
significant victory when the EGA was included in 
the CMP. Soon after, another political development 
offered an unexpected opportunity for the RFC. 
The government experimented with a new institu-
tion called National Advisory Council (NAC) com-
posed of intellectuals and civil society actors from 
different fields. The NAC was mandated to advise 
the government on implementing the CMP. Of the 
12 people, 3 were associated closely with the RFC 
and a few others had been involved at some stage. 
 
The RFC’s intensive preparation enabled the NAC 
members affiliated with the RFC to set the agenda 
at NAC. Before the government could get its act 
together, the RFC produced a draft EGA. This 
draft became the frame of reference, and when the 
government put forth its own drafts, they were 
widely portrayed as “diluted” and “weak.” Without 
this timely move by the RFC, the government 
could have taken credit for “progressive legisla-
tion.”  By framing the issue in advance, the RFC 
forced the government to revise its act and match 
its draft to the “people’s draft.” 
 
To keep momentum, the RFC organized a series of 
events and built alliances with powerful political 
personas and parties. Events were held nationally 
and in many states to keep the pressure on the 
government to legislate.19 In the run-up to the 
winter session of Parliament, a large campaign was 
organized to solicit nationwide support for the 
EGA. More than 1 million signatures were collected 
from people in 400 out of 500 districts in India. 
The signatures were displayed in a large meeting in 
Delhi in front of the Parliament on the same day. 
After further rounds of bargaining to strengthen 
                                                 
19 Governments in India have notoriously used the tactic 
of introducing legislation and not completing the process 
for many years. Many bills have died a “natural death” in 
this way. 
the bill, it was finally passed and came into effect 
on February 2, 2006.   
 
Toward making policies work. In addition to fight-
ing to put hunger and malnutrition on govern-
ments’ agendas and keep it there, the other 
challenge is to ensure that the benefits of govern-
ment schemes reach the intended beneficiaries.  
 
To see how this can happen, recall that in the case 
of Parivartan and the PDS, a system of checks-and-
balances built by the government was rendered 
irrelevant by the network built between various 
actors in the system. Attempts to restore the 
government’s controls tested the strength of this 
nexus of vested interests, driving them to adopt 
means that included intimidation and violence. The 
beneficiaries who were being denied the benefits 
were “kept in their place” by ignorance (that they 
were beneficiaries), the impassivity of the system, 
and ultimately by violence. The vendors were 
taking significant risks to escape punishment. That 
they were pressed into taking such risks is an indi-
cation that their system of corruption was under 
pressure and that they feared that the formal 
punitive mechanisms would actually be activated.   
 
The formal rules that frame food schemes could 
end up benefiting the powerful if the nexus of 
vested interests remain and their sources of power 
are not removed. Can this tight-knit network be 
broken? A network of organizations led by 
Mazdoor Kisan Sangharsh Samiti (MKSS) in 
Rajasthan did just that.  
 
The state of Rajasthan has been a hotbed of 
inspiring activism in India, especially on the issue of 
food. In the region where MKSS started working, 
property rights over land were kept secret from 
the people themselves. Because people did not 
know whether a piece of land belonged to them, 
they were vulnerable to exploitation by the power-
ful in the village. MKSS cultivated allies within the 
administration, and when the district administrator 
gave them the right to check land records, which 
they did in 1988, all hell broke loose. This was the 
beginning of a campaign that has been running for 
about two decades. MKSS realized that the elites 
would find it more difficult to exploit people who 
knew their entitlements—in other words, 
information is power.  
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When the district administrator gave MKSS infor-
mation on land records, it was a discretionary move 
by a friend. Rajasthan did not have a freedom of 
information law requiring officials to give them 
information on various government schemes. To 
harness the power that information offered, MKSS 
decided to work toward a right to information law. 
The group built strong networks on the ground in 
their community and formed a network of like-
minded organizations across the state. The gov-
ernment, for its part, was not willing to part with 
the power but had no legitimate argument against 
such a law. The adverse publicity generated by the 
media was embarrassing and did not auger well in a 
democratic polity. The government’s delay tactics 
were met by a resolved campaign. The right to 
information act was finally passed amid a protest 
that continued for 53 days20 in the state capital, 
attracting nationwide attention.  
 
The question then arises: Why agitate for laws if 
laws are not being implemented anyway? The 
answer is that laws may not be sufficient, but they 
are enabling. Collective action and public attention 
potentially foster greater implementation of laws, 
particularly in democratic regimes. Without the 
Right to Information (RTI) Act, an official who 
denied information was justified and faced no 
threat of punishment. The legislation made infor-
mation a clear entitlement whose denial is now 
punishable. Equally important, the law creates a new 
norm that makes the denial of information illegiti-
mate, thus making the protests of the campaigns 
more powerful. 
 
As Parivartan’s experience shows, entitlements do 
not get converted into reality automatically. A 
network of vested interests will try to appropriate 
the entitlements. The strategy of MKSS was to 
counter this kind of power with empowerment. If a 
beneficiary does not know that he or she is 
receiving a benefit on paper, he or she is less likely 
to protest when the benefit is not forthcoming. 
The vulnerability of ignorance can be overcome 
only with the power of information. Without this 
enabling law, the government could have resisted 
people’s attempts to get information with more 
legitimacy, and thus more authority. The law had 
converted the denial of information into an illegi-
timate activity and added much moral authority to 
the campaign. Using this legitimacy, MKSS 
                                                 
20 The dharana ended on July 14, 1997. 
weakened any further resistance with consistent 
mobilization.  
 
Many beneficiaries knew they were being swindled. 
Did demanding information generate any results 
for them? The answer is a resounding yes. Getting 
information on paper gave beneficiaries an impor-
tant tactical advantage. In a government system 
paperwork is of great importance and is the ulti-
mate instrument in activating formal redress 
processes. Corruption can often be established with 
official papers. For example, one of the authors 
encountered a corrupt official who employed three 
people just to affix fake signatures of intended 
beneficiaries. This practice was known and accepted 
within his corrupt system—were it subject to 
challenge, these signatures could clearly be used as 
evidence against him. A village-level official told us 
that he would rather part with his life than his 
papers! 
 
MKSS was empowering people not just by increas-
ing the threat of activating the formal system of 
punishments, but also by strengthening people 
socially. The accounts received from the administra-
tion were read aloud in large public meetings called 
social audits, which were sources of both amuse-
ment and anger. To their amusement, people found 
that people long dead had worked on projects and 
duly signed for their payments. But mostly to their 
anger, they found that many of them had been 
cheated of benefits that could have helped them 
escape from the acute misery of hunger. This anger 
mobilized people to act collectively, thus creating 
an alternative network of power. This process is 
also acutely embarrassing for local officials and 
vendors, who often come from the same 
communities as the swindled beneficiaries.21   
 
Collective action is difficult to initiate and sustain, 
but when it succeeds it can be extremely 
empowering for those who are individually mar-
ginalized or powerless. It is more difficult to 
intimidate a group than to deal with bold 
individuals. Collective action also creates a sustained 
public debate that is embarrassing and potentially 
costly in a democratic framework. It is far more 
difficult for an individual to get public attention or 
                                                 
21 A documentary entitled “Right to Information and 
Corruption” by Jan Madhyam Productions provides a 
detailed account of how social audits work. It is available 
in the public realm, including on Google Videos. 
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the attention of media. Working in groups also 
enables the creation of allies within and outside the 
community. For example, working in groups 
enabled people in Rajasthan to gain access to higher 
government officials, media, influential people, 
politicians, and others that strain the nexus of 
corruption. 
 
Reasonable evidence shows that the efforts of long 
campaigns by MKSS have borne fruit. Recent 
surveys reveal that regions and schemes on which 
MKSS and others in Rajasthan have worked in a 
sustained fashion have much less corruption. The 
success of MKSS also encouraged like-minded 
organizations in other parts of the state to adopt 
similar tactics. The results have been equally 
encouraging in other regions where anti-corruption 
efforts have lasted for a considerable duration.   
 
In fact, the right to information campaign changed 
the work culture of Rajasthan significantly. A 
recent survey on employment programs in differ-
ent states in India found that people were able to 
get official accounts and other information more 
easily in Rajasthan than in other states. This is not 
because Rajasthan has an RTI Act; in 2005 India 
passed a Right to Information Act that made the 
law applicable across the country. It is not because 
people in Rajasthan were agitating when others 
were not. In fact, groups in neighboring states were 
agitating heavily for information that was now rou-
tinely available in Rajasthan. The difference lies in 
the history of agitation in Rajasthan on this issue. 
By refusing to accept denial of information or cor-
ruption for more than a decade, the campaign 
changed the work culture. At the beginning of the 
campaign, it was the norm for officials to deny 
information, and they could count on support for 
these denials from fellow officials. But a decade of 
the campaign changed this norm. An official who 
denies information is now outside the norm and 
attracts immediate attention. People are now used 
to getting their papers quickly and are prone to 
complain and agitate more if they do not get what 
others normally get. Because of its ability to affect 
culture, a campaign can be powerful over the long 
run, even if it ceases to be active an active force.  
 
The histories of countries that now have low levels 
of corruption show that sustained agitation by 
people was instrumental in reducing levels of cor-
ruption over time. Once a lower level of 
corruption becomes the norm, it becomes self-
reinforcing without the need for continuous 
struggle.22   
 
Food Policy Making in Perspective 
Given the variety of interests within the state, it is 
almost impossible to speak of the “government’s 
perspective.” In practice, social movements like the 
RFC have a conflicting relationship with the state, 
since these campaigns exist to change the system. 
This situation poses a dilemma for officials who are 
keen to see food programs reach people. On the 
one hand, the RFC is an ally in the government’s 
fight against hunger and malnutrition. Within the 
movement’s broad agenda, the RFC has the power 
to transform societal norms and work toward 
ensuring that programs and policies are imple-
mented and benefit those they are intended for. 
Yet within the democratic framework, it achieves 
this goal through collective action that involves 
taking on the state and its functionaries, often 
exposing the weak links, leakage, and corruption. 
How do concerned policy makers engage with such 
a social movement? In a democratic setting, how 
can the state provide a space for a movement in a 
way that allows it to be a partner in change? 
The examples in this case study point to four 
broad ways concerned food policy administrators 
can assist the process: 
1. Providing entitlements: Entitlements give some-
thing to fight for. If entitlements do not exist, the 
effort of social movements would go toward trying 
to create them. The bases of clear entitlements are 
clear eligibility norms and clear specification of 
benefits. These norms and specifications should be 
as simple as possible, and the eligibility norms 
should not divide people who must act collectively 
for their benefits. 
2. Creating an enabling legal structure: An enabling 
legal structure weakens the source of power of the 
nexus and empowers intended beneficiaries. Sources 
of power come in many forms, and these differ 
across societies. Power can be based on social net-
works, control of information, and the physical and 
social distance of decision makers and those 
                                                 
22 For illuminating case studies on corruption and for 
systematic thinking on this issue, see Heidenheimer and 
Johnston (2001), Johnston (1997), Peck (1993), Mooij 
(1999c), and Wade (1982). 
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wielding power in the formal structure. Some 
elements can be found across societies, and some 
are specific to societies.  
An enabling legal structure provides formal 
incentives in the form of carrots and sticks that 
encourage officials to act in ways that assist 
intended beneficiaries. Such a structure takes into 
account the informal rules that affect the formal 
incentive structure and strengthens it accordingly. 
The RTI Act and the EGA are examples of enabling 
legal structures. 
3. Act as allies: The importance of allies cannot be 
underestimated. Allies with influence over the 
formal processes add to the strength of collective 
action. Sometimes an ally can accomplish what a 
sustained campaign fails to achieve over many 
months. Allies can be institutionalized in form of 
responsive and accessible institutions. 
4. Set workplace norms: Norms are not merely set 
by cultural factors that are beyond influence. 
Norms are defined by “official” policies and laws. In 
addition, through their own style of work, 
administrators can have a powerful influence on the 
norms of their workplace.  
In short, food policy administrators need to 
recognize that schemes are often designed with a 
formal incentive structure to help them work as 
intended. But these formal incentive structures do 
not work in isolation. The actual incentive structure 
is determined by the formal rules acting with the 
informal rules of the social context. Those in need 
of food schemes are poor and often marginalized, 
making it easy for those in positions of power to 
hijack their benefits. Collective action is capable of 
empowering people and helping them get their due 
benefits. Collective action in turn is strengthened 
by an enabling legal structure and by allies in the 
administration, media, police, and other powerful 
organizations. Together, these elements can make a 
low level of corruption the norm and thus help 
people get their entitlements automatically. 
Moreover, when people have the power of 
information and knowledge, the government can 
address hunger and malnutrition much more 
effectively than otherwise. 
Assignment  
 
Your assignment is to recommend how the 
Government of India can engage with the Right to 
Food Campaign as an ally in its fight against hunger 
and malnutrition. What can it do at the macro-
policy level to address these issues? And what 
measures can it take to break the network of 
vested interests that undermine the implementation 
of food-related programs? 
 
Note 
 
Many people in the Right to Food Campaign as-
sisted us in preparing this paper. It would be 
impossible to mention them all, but a few deserve a 
special mention. Jean Drèze has been a great source 
of knowledge and inspiration for both of us. Kavita 
Srivastava, Harsh Mander, N. C. Saxena, and S. R. 
Sankaran, among others, contributed immensely to 
our thinking on the issues. We also borrowed 
heavily from materials prepared by the Right to 
Food Campaign, including the Campaign website. 
Our teachers at Cornell University and Syracuse 
University have also guided our work on this 
paper. We wish to acknowledge John Burdick, Per 
Pinstrup-Andersen, Fuzhi Cheng, and participants 
in the seminar course organized by the latter two 
at Cornell University, as well as two anonymous 
referees, all of whom read and commented 
extensively on an earlier version of this paper. 
 
Additional Readings 
 
Drèze, J. 2004. Democracy and the right to food. 
Economic and Political Weekly, April 24. 
Kent, G. 2002. The human right to food in India. 
University of Hawai’i. Unpublished paper. 
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